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I. Introduction
Mass incarceration in the United States continues largely unabated, as the
U.S. imprisons more people than any nation in the world.1 The U.S. is also the
world leader in prison population rate.2 Scholars have noted that policies governing
criminal punishment in the U.S. are often lacking in public safety rationale,
inflicting overly harsh sentences, and disproportionately affecting minorities.3
The financial cost of these policies is staggering. Roughly 2.3 million people are
currently incarcerated in America, a five hundred percent increase over the last forty
years, costing nearly eighty billion dollars per year.4 These astonishing numbers do
not begin to shed light on the associated human suffering, not only for the offenders
but their family, friends, and community.5 An increasing number of Americans are
aware of these problems and open to reform.6
The State of Wyoming has felt the economic pressures created by the mass
incarceration movement.7 The economic situation has only worsened as the impact
of an oil price war and COVID-19 slashed one-third of Wyoming’s projected state
revenue.8 Similar to other states, Wyoming sought assistance from the Council on
State Governments (CSG) by participating in the Justice Reinvestment Initiative
(JRI) to attempt to reduce its prison population, lower recidivism rates, and increase
public safety.9 Wyoming’s JRI project was a collaborative effort that marshalled
input and data from virtually all stakeholders in Wyoming’s criminal justice

1
James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (July 20, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/history-mass-incarceration
[https://
perma.cc/M7CZ-B5Y9].
2

Id.

3

Id.

Deborah L. Rhode, Character in Criminal Justice Proceedings: Rethinking Its Role in Rules
Governing Evidence, Punishment, Prosecutors, and Parole, 45 Am. J. Crim. L. 353, 368 (2019).
4

5

See id.

See Cullen, supra note 1; 91 Percent of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU
Polling Finds, ACLU (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/91-percent-americanssupport-criminal-justice-reform-aclu-polling-finds [https://perma.cc/R7ZJ-9BR8].
6

7
Andrew Graham, Officials: Budget Cuts Will Make Prisons, Communities Less Safe,
WyoFile (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.wyofile.com/officials-budget-cuts-will-make-prisonscommunities-less-safe/ [https://perma.cc/4FK9-VM4W].
8

Id.

Raqueal Adu-Num et al., Just. Ctr.: The Council of State Gov’ts, Wyoming
Joint Judiciary Interim Committee: September 20–21, 2018, https://www.wyoleg.gov/
InterimCommittee/2018/01-201809202-01WYJJCslidesFinalSept20-LSOcorrected.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RTT6-AAKX]. The Justice Reinvestment Initiative “is a data-driven approach to improve
public safety, decrease correctional spending and associated criminal justice spending, and reinvest
savings in strategies can decrease crime and reduce recidivism.” About, Just. Ctr.: The Council
of State Gov’ts, https://csgjusticecenter.org/projects/justice-reinvestment/about/ [https://perma.
cc/7SJP-35B9] (last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
9
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system: judges, prosecutors, public defenders, sheriffs, behavioral health treatment
providers, probation and parole agents, and other interested groups.10
After analyzing the data, the CSG ultimately created a report for the Wyoming
Joint Judiciary Interim Committee in 2018.11 The report contained findings for
virtually every area of Wyoming’s criminal justice system, from arrest to release on
parole.12 Perhaps most troubling, the report found that Wyoming taxpayers will
face a fifty million dollar bill to accommodate projected prison growth by fiscal
year 2023.13 Moreover, the report found that the vast majority of revocations for
offenders on supervision in the community “are due to violations of supervision
conditions without a new felony conviction, many involving drug use.”14 For
individuals on parole, the report found that eighty-seven percent of Wyoming
parolees who returned to prison had violated their parole without a new felony
conviction.15 The CSG report further highlighted specific Wyoming criminal
statutes to be reformed for arguably lacking a clear public safety rationale and
producing excessive sentences.16
This article’s primary purpose is to examine a specific CSG finding—that
Wyoming statutes predispose the Wyoming Board of Parole (Board) to impose
lengthy periods of incarceration following parole violations.17 To reduce the
expected expansion in Wyoming’s prison population, the CSG report recommended
that Wyoming either reduce probation and parole revocations by fifty percent,
reduce revocation length of stay by just over fifty percent, or a combination of
both.18 Following the CSG report, the Wyoming Legislature modified the manner
in which the Board deals with “street time.”19 For purposes of this article, “street
time” is a colloquial term used to refer to the time that an individual spends on
parole after release from prison by a paroling authority.20 At the time of the CSG
report in 2018, Wyoming’s statute favored denying credit for street time if an
individual’s parole was revoked:
In computing the remainder of the sentence to be served by a parole
violator, no credit shall be given against his original sentence for any

10

Adu-Num et al., supra note 9, at 11.

11

See generally id.

12

See generally id.

13

Id. at 13.

14

Id. at 73.

15

Id. at 82.

16

See id. at 30, 85–86.

17

Id. at 86.

18

Id. at 91.

Act of Feb. 26, 2019, ch. 116, § 2, 2019 Wyo. Laws (H.B. 52) (codified as amended at
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-404 (2021)).
19

20

See Camacho v. White, 918 F.2d 74, 76 (9th Cir. 1990).
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portion of the time between his release on parole and his return to the
institution unless the board directs otherwise.21
In 2019, the Legislature modified the statute and flipped the presumption
regarding street time upon revocation.22 By deleting the word “no” the statute now
favors crediting parolees street time, unless the Board exercises its discretion to
deny it.23 Prior to this change, any parole revocation in Wyoming resulted in the
loss of all street time served by an inmate, unless the Board exercised its discretion
to decide otherwise.24 Although the recent statutory amendment has reversed this
presumption, the ultimate decision of whether to credit street time upon parole
revocation remains discretionary.25 Even under the new version of the statute, the
question remains: has the statutory change had any impact upon the length of
incarceration following parole revocation?
Before attempting to answer that question, this article first undertakes a review
of the historical framework, including policy considerations; various approaches
to street time in different jurisdictions; and parole related research.26 This article
examines the lack of standards or requirements for appointment to the Wyoming
Board, how many jurisdictions also lack similar credentials for parole board
members, and neighboring states with modern parole membership requirements.27
Finally, this article recommends Wyoming amend two of its parole statutes.28 First,
Wyoming should mandate the Board grant credit for street time to Wyoming
parolees who have no new felony convictions and who have not absconded during
their time on parole.29 Second, the structure and composition of the Wyoming
Board should be redesigned to ensure that members possess the necessary education
and expertise relevant to making these crucially important decisions.30

II. The Precarious Nature of Street Time
Living on “the street” while on parole is fraught with peril and contradictions.
One school of thought views street time as a luxury, a reprieve from the harsh

21

Act of Mar. 6, 1987, ch. 157, § 3, 1987 Wyo. Laws (H.B. 92).

22

Act of Feb. 26, 2019, ch. 116, § 2.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-404. The statute now reads “credit shall be awarded toward his
original sentence for any portion of the time that the person has not violated a condition of parole
between his release on parole and his return to the institution unless the board directs otherwise.” Id.
23

24

Act of Mar. 6, 1987, ch. 157, § 3.

25

See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.

26

See infra Part II.

27

See infra Part III.

28

See infra Part IV.

29

See infra notes 167–191and accompanying text.

See infra notes 192–198 and accompanying text. Although this article focuses on
recommendations for amending Wyoming’s Board of Parole, such recommendations could be easily
applied to other jurisdictions seeking solutions to stem the tide of future prison growth.
30
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conditions of prison that any inmate should be grateful to receive.31 Another
perspective is that parole represents a significant burden on individual liberty,
little better than imprisonment.32 The United States Supreme Court observed the
restrictions a person on parole in Virginia faces:
Petitioner is confined by the parole order to a particular community,
house, and job at the sufferance of his parole officer. He cannot drive a
car without permission. He must periodically report to his parole officer,
permit the officer to visit his home and job at any time, and follow the
officer’s advice. He is admonished to keep good company and good
hours, work regularly, keep away from undesirable places, and live a
clean, honest and temperate life. Petitioner must not only faithfully obey
these restrictions and conditions but he must live in constant fear that a
single deviation, however slight, might be enough to result in his being
returned to prison . . . .33
Although the aforementioned quote from the Supreme Court is nearing sixty years
old, very little has changed with regard to the modern legal treatment of individuals
on parole.34 In a more recent opinion, the Court reiterated that persons on parole
have a greatly reduced expectation of privacy from that of ordinary citizens.35 Samson
v. California involved a search of a parolee, who was searched merely because of his
status as such.36 The search was conducted pursuant to a California state statute which
authorized warrantless searches of parolees by law enforcement without any cause.37
The search revealed methamphetamine, and in holding the statute constitutional,
the Court relied upon precedent upholding the warrantless search of a probationer
as a condition of probation.38 Samson is particularly relevant to the argument that
life on parole is only slightly better than prison in terms of individual freedoms.39
Accordingly, street time should be considered as time served.40
While probation and parole are similar and often confused, they differ in
significant ways.41 Probation is generally considered to be a sentence of community
supervision imposed by a court for a criminal offense, typically in lieu of a prison

31
A la Recherche du Temps Perdu: The Constitutionality of Denial of Credit on Revocation of
Parole, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 762, 764–65 (1968).
32

Id. at 765–66.

33

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963).

34

See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.

35

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 849 (2006).

36

Id. at 846.

37

Id. at 846–47.

38

Id. at 847, 852.

39

See id. at 856; see supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.

40

See supra notes 32–39 and accompanying text.

41

See infra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
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sentence.42 Under Wyoming law, probation is defined as “a sentence not involving
confinement which imposes conditions and retains authority in the sentencing court
to modify the conditions of the sentence or to resentence the offender if he violates
the conditions . . . .”43 Parole, on the other hand, is an administrative function and
not a judicial decision.44 Unlike probation, parole begins after an individual has
completed serving some portion of a prison sentence.45 The Wyoming Legislature
defines parole as “permission to leave the confines of the institution in which a
person is confined under specified conditions, but does not operate as a discharge
of the person . . . .”46
Samson ascribed an even greater level of restraint upon parolees than that of
probationers, holding that “parolees have fewer expectations of privacy . . . because
parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.” 47 Clearly,
the Court believes that parole is the rough equivalent of living in prison, at least in
terms of the individual liberties possessed by parolees.48 Why then, have so many
jurisdictions, Wyoming included, made the legislative decision to predispose parole
boards or releasing authorities toward imposing lengthy sentences as punishment
for parole violations by denying credit for street time?
A. Policy Issues and Legal Arguments Relative to Street Time
There are several policy and legal arguments favoring granting credit for time
spent on parole.49 Both fiscal responsibility and fairness serve as justifications for
crediting street time to parolees. It is only natural that many people would choose
parole and life on the street as an alternative to prison. Although some may perceive
parole as the equivalent to living life as an ordinary citizen, parolees confront
significant obstacles upon release.50 Many assistance programs including education
loans, driving privileges, public housing, and food stamps are often unattainable
for parolees.51 As U.S. prison rates have reached the level of mass incarceration,
parole supervision rates similarly increased.52 The enormity of parole supervision in
the U.S. becomes more evident when compared to other countries.53 For example,

42

Probation, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

43

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-401(a)(x) (2021).

44

See infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.

45

Compare Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-401(a)(vii), with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-401(a)(x).

46

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-401(a)(vii).

47

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006).

48

See id.

49

See infra notes 50–66 and accompanying text.

Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Facing the Challenges of Prisoner
Reentry 63 (2005).
50

51

Id.

Kevin R. Reitz & Edward E. Rhine, Parole Release and Supervision: Critical Drivers of
American Prison Policy, 3 Ann. Rev. Criminology 281, 287 (2020).
52
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“[a]verage parole-supervision rates in the U.S. are more than four times those in
Eastern and Western Europe, and five times those in Australia.”54 By 2012, parole
violators consisted of twenty-seven percent of U.S. prison admissions, with a slight
rise to twenty-eight percent in 2014.55 Parole revocations in Europe have had far less
of an impact on increasing prison populations than in the United States, making
up only 7.4% of all European prison admissions in 2012.56
The disproportionately high number of revocations in the U.S. provides an
adequate reason to devote more attention to the issue, whether through legislative or
administrative action. Granting parolees credit for street time is a logical and feasible
avenue to effect meaningful change in the struggle to reduce mass incarceration.57
By enacting laws and policies that favor granting credit for street time for parolees
on a wider scale, Wyoming and the country could save considerable amounts of
money and resources.58
Beyond the fiscal argument, there is also a fairness issue by refusing to credit time
spent on parole to individuals who commit misdemeanors or technical violations.59
Granted, in many parole revocations, laws have been broken, and justice must
be served. Nevertheless, the return to prison is arguably punishment enough. It
makes little sense to deny credit for street time in that instance, particularly when
the Court has declared that time spent on parole is essentially equivalent to time
in prison.60
Typically, when parole is revoked, the parole board or releasing authority must
decide how much (if any) credit the parolee should receive for their street time.61 The
impact of this decision can be devastating to the parolee. Consider a hypothetical:
in 2015 an offender is sentenced to a ten-year prison term, a maximum sentence for
the crime committed, and is released on parole in 2019. Without factoring in any
possible good time while on parole, assume the offender violates his parole after five
years on “the street” and is sent back to prison in 2024. If the hypothetical parole
board refuses to credit the parolee with any street time, that five years is added back
into the sentence. The offender would then potentially be required to continue
serving the sentence until sometime in 2029, for a total of roughly fourteen years,
rather than the original maximum of ten years. If paroled and revoked again, the
original sentence could be infinitely extended. Such a hypothetical illustrates the

53

Id. at 288.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

See id.

57

See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text.

58

See infra notes 174–187 and accompanying text.

59

See infra notes 60–66 and accompanying text.

60

See supra notes 32–39, 47–48 and accompanying text.

61

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-404 (2021).
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potential for further clogging up the prison system without any justifiable rationale
and requiring offenders to serve well over the maximum allowable sentence.
The policy arguments in favor of crediting parolees street time reject the results
of the hypothetical posed above and claim that the state should not exert control
over offenders in excess of the maximum term of supervision or confinement
authorized by law.62 Street time is considered part of the sentence and a significant
restraint on the parolee’s liberty—it should not have to be served again.63 Conversely,
the arguments against granting street time to parolees are rooted in principles of
deterrence. The threat of losing street time is a powerful incentive to adhere to the
conditions of parole.64 If street time is automatically credited to the parolee, the
temptation to engage in prohibited behavior may also increase as the sentence nears
completion.65 The benefits of reducing Wyoming’s prison population by crediting
street time, however, outweigh the loss of the potential deterrent of withholding
street time.66
B. Categorizing Street Time Jurisdictions
Jurisdictions take varying approaches to determine whether to credit street
time to parolees upon parole revocation. Many jurisdictions credit some amount
of street time upon parole revocation with certain stipulations.67 Missouri, for
instance, provides that unless the parolee absconds from supervision, time served
on parole will be counted as time served for the sentence.68 Pennsylvania specifies
that the parole board may credit a parolee with the time spent at liberty on parole
if the parolee has not committed a violent crime or sex offense while on parole.69
Mississippi imposes certain imprisonment terms for technical violations based on
the number of times parole has been revoked in the past.70

62
Model Sentencing & Corrections Act § 3-305(b) cmt. (Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs
on Unif. State L. 1985 & Supp. 1995).
63

Connor v. Griffith, 238 S.E.2d 529, 532–34 (W. Va. 1977).

A la Recherche du Temps Perdu, supra note 31, at 763; see also Kuykendall v. Pa. Bd. of
Probation & Parole, 363 A.2d 866, 867–68 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976); Thomas v. United States, 327
F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1964) (“The pressure upon the individual during the period of probation is
of course the possibility of having to serve the sentence imposed, or of having a sentence imposed.”).
64

65

867–68.
66

See A la Recherche du Temps Perdu, supra note 31, at 763; Kuykendall, 363 A.2d at
See infra notes 168–191and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 217.720 (2021); Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6138(a)
(2.1)–(2.2) (2021).
67

68

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 217.720(3).

69

Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6138(a)(2.1)(i).

Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-27(6)(a) (2021). Upon revocation “the board shall impose
a period of imprisonment to be served in a technical violation center . . . not to exceed ninety
(90) days for the first revocation and not to exceed one hundred twenty (120) days for the second
revocation. For the third revocation, the board may impose a period of imprisonment to be served
70

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol22/iss1/5
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Other jurisdictions, including the federal government, do not credit the parolee
with any street time upon revocation.71 Texas likewise provides that a parolee whose
parole is revoked may be required “to serve the remaining portion of the person’s
sentence in the institutional division. The remaining portion of the person’s sentence
is computed without credit for the time from the date of the person’s release to the
date of revocation.”72
Several other jurisdictions credit the parolee with all of their street time
upon revocation without any stipulations.73 Kansas, for example, specifies that
“the period served on parole or conditional release shall be deemed service of the
term of confinement . . . .”74 Oregon additionally favors crediting street time,
legislating that, “[a] person who is ordered to serve a term of incarceration in a
state correctional facility as a sanction for a post-prison supervision violation shall
receive credit for time served on the post-prison supervision violation prior to the
board’s imposition of the term of incarceration.”75
Many jurisdictions, like Wyoming, leave the ultimate decision to grant or
deny parole street time entirely up to the releasing authority’s discretion.76 Other
jurisdictions have established a hybrid discretionary system balanced with categories
of violations that either mandate the award or withholding of street time.77 Just as
the topic of parole has been largely forgotten since the 1970s, so has the subject of
parole street time, and there is limited research that explores the subject. There are a
variety of approaches to administering parole street time, and state legislatures can
modify their approaches as each jurisdiction sees fit, just as Wyoming did in 2021.

in a technical violation center for up to one hundred and eighty (180) days or the board may impose
the remainder of the suspended portion of the sentence.” Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2018) (requiring “the defendant to serve in prison all or
part of the term of supervised release . . . without credit for time previously served on postrelease
supervision, if the court, . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a
condition of supervised release . . .”).
71

Texas Gov’t Code Ann. § 508.156(e) (2021). Texas does credit street time for nonviolent parolees if they have served more than half of the amount of time left on their sentence at
the time of parole. See id. § 508.283(c); Matthew T. Clarke, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Clarifies
Law Crediting “Street Time”, Prison Legal News (Nov. 15, 2004), https://www.prisonlegalnews.
org/news/2004/nov/15/texas-court-of-criminal-appeals-clarifies-law-crediting-street-time/ [https://
perma.cc/RGU7-R683].
72

73

See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.

74

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3722 (2021).

75

Oregon Rev. Stat. Ann. §144.108(4) (2021).

E.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-404 (providing street time shall be awarded unless the
board directs otherwise).
76

77
E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 63M-7-404(5) (2021) (implementing a sentencing commission
to establish sentencing guidelines based on the “seriousness of the violation of the conditions of
parole, the individual’s conduct while on parole, and the individual’s criminal history”).
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III. History of Parole and Parole Related Research
A. History Surrounding the Discretionary Parole System
Discretionary parole was first introduced in the nineteenth century. In 1870,
the National Prison Association gathered in Cincinnati, Ohio, and recommended
states adopt an indeterminate sentencing with discretionary parole system.78
In 1907, New York became the first state to formally adopt an indeterminate
sentencing and discretionary parole system, along with post-release supervision
and criteria for revocation.79 By 1942, all other states and the federal government
operated a system of discretionary parole.80 Until the mid-1970s, every state and
the federal government operated a parole system that permitted early release from
prison for those who could demonstrate evidence of rehabilitation.81 During this
golden age of parole, nearly three quarters of all departures from prison occurred
through parole.82
The process lost popularity, however, as studies surfaced documenting
widespread issues involved with the process.83 One study found that many parolees
continued to violate the terms of their release.84 The study further found that
parole decisions were often idiosyncratic, inconsistent, and subject to race and
class biases.85 James Q. Wilson, a noted expert of the era, claimed that the United
States should abandon rehabilitation as a primary goal of corrections and focus its
purpose as simply “to isolate and punish.”86 Wilson maintained that this approach
was neither cruel nor barbaric, but rather “a frank admission that society really
does not know how to do much else.”87
The public largely agreed with Wilson’s assessment.88 Over the last forty-five
years, many jurisdictions around the nation have eliminated parole, not only
removing parole board discretion from the release process but disbanding parole
boards altogether.89 By 2013, thirty-four states and the federal government had

78
Joan Petersilia & Jimmy Threatt, Release from Prison, in The Encyclopedia of
Corrections 1 (Kent R. Kerley ed., 2017).
79

Id. at 2.

80

Id.

81

Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry 62

(2003).
82

Id.

83

Id. at 63.

84

Id.

85

Id.; Petersilia & Threatt, supra note 78, at 3.

86

James Wilson, Thinking About Crime 172 (1975).

87

Id. at 173.

88

See supra note 83–87 and infra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.

89

See Petersilia & Threatt, supra note 78, at 4.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol22/iss1/5
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol21/iss2/2

10
142

Fetsco: No Credit for Time Served

2022

No Credit for Time Served

143

eliminated or restricted the use of discretionary parole, and the number of state
prisoners released early dropped to thirty percent.90 The abolition of parole and
movement toward mass incarceration, has led to the adoption of determinate
sentencing and mandatory minimums throughout many jurisdictions.91
Wyoming, however, has never wavered in its operation of a truly indeterminate
sentencing system. In fact, Wyoming continues to maintain a parole board with a
robust amount of discretion.92 Some jurisdiction’s parole boards still exercise a good
deal of discretion regarding parole revocation decisions.93 Scholars have identified
various reasons to favor discretion in parole revocation decisions. For example,
the decision to revoke parole is an administrative rather than a legal decision.94
Even considering this distinction, the discretion incorporated in parole boards has
previously confronted opposition. That very discretion was a principal reason why
so many states abolished parole in the 1970s and 80s.95 The conservative viewpoint
painted parole boards as soft on crime, while the liberal viewpoint regarded parole
boards as racist and punitive.96 Consequently, discretionary parole boards fell out
of favor with the American public.97
B. Structural Issues with Wyoming’s Parole Board
The impact that parole boards have on the criminal justice system should not
be ignored. While there are few parole board members, they exercise enormous
power. In 2013, 340 parole board members in forty-six states granted 187,035
parolees discretionary release.98 Despite their importance, many parole board
members possess little to no experience, education, or training for their jobs.99
Parole board members are often political appointees, in some cases with little to no
legal expertise,100 and parole revocation hearings use a lower evidentiary standard
than in criminal courts—“preponderance of the evidence” rather than “beyond a
reasonable doubt.”101 The gubernatorial appointments are often subject to legislative
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Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 (2021).
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Sara Steen & Tara Opsal, “Punishment on the Installment Plan”: Individual-Level Predictors
of Parole Revocation in Four States, 87 The Prison J. 344, 347 (2007).
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Id. at 4.
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Edward E. Rhine et al., The Future of Parole Release, 46 Crime & Just. 279, 285 (2017).

Id. at 286. See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 (2021) (creating a parole board
without qualification requirements and consisting of seven members who are political appointees of
the governor).
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Steen & Opsal, supra note 94, at 347; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2018).
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confirmation, and account for membership on forty-three of the parole boards in
the United States, including Wyoming.102
A frequently echoed criticism focuses on the few formal credentials required
for appointment to a parole board, whether educational, experience-based, or
otherwise. Wyoming’s statutory scheme for the creation of the state board of parole
does not include any qualifications or background experience as a prerequisite for
membership on the parole board.103 There is no requirement that the parole board
member even be a Wyoming resident.104 States surrounding Wyoming, however,
have established significantly more requirements for membership on their parole
boards. In Montana, for instance, board appointees must possess “a college degree
in criminology, corrections, or a related social science; at least five years extensive
work experience in corrections, the criminal justice system, or criminal law; or a
law degree.”105 The Montana board calls for consideration to be given to “balancing
members’ expertise or knowledge of American Indian culture; serious mental illness
and recovery from serious mental illness; and victim awareness.”106 Nebraska
requires that board appointees be of good character and judicious temperament.107
Nebraska also requires that one member be female, one member be from an ethnic
group, and at least one member have a background in corrections.108 In Colorado,
the board must be composed of representatives from multidisciplinary areas of
expertise.109 Colorado also requires that two members be from law enforcement,
one member be a former probation or parole officer, and the remaining members
have experience in other relevant fields.110 South Dakota requires that three of
their board members be attorneys.111 Conversely, before their appointment, many
Wyoming Board of Parole members do not have any background in the criminal
justice system, with some unfamiliar with fundamental workings of the criminal
justice system.112

administrative decision rather than a legal one, parolees have fewer legal rights at this decision
point . . . . [and] [b]ecause they are held as administrative hearings, revocation hearings are far less
protective of defendants than the adjudicatory route.” (internal quotations omitted)).
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Revocation decisions are also not visible to the public and occur in correctional
settings, typically prisons.113 The public is not present for these decisions and
consequently, parole board members are less likely to be held accountable for their
decisions.114 In terms of transparency, the Wyoming Board does not currently
publish any data on their activities.115 A review of the Board’s website and annual
report reveals an absence of any publicly accessible information concerning parole
hearings, revocations, or other duties of the Board.116
C. Research Concerning Technical Violations
There is minimal research that has examined the parole revocation process.
There is even less scholarship pertaining to parole street time. The majority of
research related to mass incarceration focuses on the “front-end” of sentencing.117
Alternatively, “back-end” sentences include those issued by parole boards to
released prisoners whose parole has been revoked.118 Such “back-end” sentences
comprise of a growing source of overall prison admissions.119 The percentage of
prison admissions coming from back-end sentences increased dramatically from
1980 to 2008, up from 16.1% to 36.2%, and totaling more than a third of all
prison admissions.120
Most research into the parole revocation process focuses on the causes behind
revocation or the factors behind the parole board’s considerations for making
revocation decisions.121 This research indicates that the probability of parole failure
is highest immediately after release and diminishes over time.122 Although there is
significant research in this area, little is known about the types of violations that
result in parole revocation and back-ended returns to prison.123
113

Steen & Opsal, supra note 94, at 347–48.
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Id. at 348.

Wyoming Board of Parole, Wyo.gov, http://boardofparole.wyo.gov [https://perma.cc/
Q8S8-TFJX] (last visited Nov. 28, 2021); Annual Report, Wyo.gov, https://sites.google.com/a/wyo.
gov/bop/about-us/annual-report [https://perma.cc/GQ3Z-VPLS] (last visited Nov. 28, 2021) (to
locate, click “Wyoming Board of Parole Annual report (PDF)”).
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Jeffrey Lin et al., “Back End Sentencing” and Reimprisonment: Individual, Organizational,
and Community Predictors of Parole Sanctioning Decisions, 48 Criminology 759, 761 (2010).
“Front-end” of sentencing refers to the sentences pronounced by criminal courts for newly convicted
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A question to consider, then, is how do parole violations occur? Individuals
released on parole are expected to adhere to numerous requirements which vary
greatly between parolees and jurisdictions. At a minimum, requirements generally
include abstinence from drug and alcohol use; submitting to testing and treatment;
paying fines, fees, and restitution; securing housing and maintaining employment;
and avoiding contact with other known felons.124 Violating many of these conditions,
such as alcohol consumption, are not crimes if committed by ordinary citizens. Such
transgressions—that do not violate any laws yet constitute a failure to abide by the
rules of parole—are commonly referred to as technical violations.125
Wyoming statutes employ similar parlance, using the term “compliance
violation” to broadly describe a technical violation as an act that does not result
in arrest for a misdemeanor or felony, or is not absconding from supervision.126
Essentially, any violation other than an arrest or absconding while on parole is
a “compliance violation” (technical violation) under Wyoming law.127 When
parolees commit technical violations, the parole agent has a number of options:
administering sanctions, increasing other requirements, and requiring additional
treatment.128 If the violation is serious enough, such as absconding from supervision
or committing a felony, the agent typically has no choice but to seek revocation
and return the parolee to prison.129
Many parole conditions have yet to be studied or tested to determine if the
conditions are accurate predictors of new crimes.130 Recent research indicates
that there are observable, patterned differences between parolees who commit
technical violations and those who commit new crimes.131 A long held belief exists
in corrections that technical violations on parole “serve as a proxy of an offender’s
potential [for] committing a new crime.” Yet, one study involving parolees in
Washington State found technical violations are not proxies for new crimes for
male populations on community supervision.132 With regard to technical violations,
parolees with significant mental health needs are, on average, sixty percent more
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Mary Morash et al., Technical Violations, Treatment and Punishment Responses, and
Recidivism of Women on Probation and Parole, 30 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 788, 789 (2019).
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likely to commit technical violation behaviors than those without such needs.133
Additionally, a study of males incarcerated in one southern state found that when
comparing parolees who are revoked and returned to prison for either technical
violations or new crimes, the technical violators were far less likely to engage in
any form of prison misconduct.134
While good conduct in prison may not translate into continued law-abiding
behavior in the community, the results of this study suggest that decreasing the
number of technical violators returned to prison may be a viable option to reduce
the nation’s, and Wyoming’s, prison population while maintaining public safety.135
Further, the vast majority of prison inmates will be released at some point, and
technical violators are no different.136 Using valuable prison resources on technical
violators who may only spend a short time in prison is arguably not the most
efficient or fiscally responsible course of action.137 Instead, those resources should
be focused on parolees who have committed new and serious crimes.138
Despite the issues inherent in a discretionary system of parole, this article does
not suggest that parole board discretion should be limited beyond this specific area
of decision-making. The role that the Wyoming Board and other parole boards
around the U.S. plays is vital for maintaining a fair and orderly early release system
from prison. The data further supports that critical role.139 When comparing
offenders released by parole boards to offenders who are released unconditionally,
those released unconditionally are more likely to commit new crimes.140 While
parole boards are often criticized for releasing inmates early, there is greater length
of time served in prison in those states with discretionary parole.141 For violent
crimes, men served sixty months prior to discretionary release compared to fortyeight months for men who received a mandatory sentence with automatic release.142
An additional study found “that discretionary parole was associated with longer

133
Sara Steen et al., Putting Parolees Back in Prison: Discretion and the Parole Revocation
Process, 38 Crim. Just. Rev. 70, 88 (2012).

Erin A. Orrick & Robert Morris, Do Parole Technical Violators Pose a Safety Threat? An
Analysis of Prison Misconduct, 61 Crime & Delinq. 1027, 1041 (2015). Although the authors
identify the area as a “southern” U.S. state they do not directly identify which state the study focused
on. See id. at 1027.
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prison terms, even when offense, prior record, age, gender and conviction crime
type were statistically controlled.”143 The same study “found that for almost every
offense, especially violent crimes, those released discretionarily served longer prison
terms even though they were almost twice as likely to successfully complete parole
supervision than those released mandatorily.”144
There may be some concern that modifying Wyoming’s statute as proposed
will limit the discretion possessed by the Wyoming Board. Although this may be
true where a parolee commits multiple technical violations or is convicted of a
misdemeanor, the most important discretionary functions of the Board would
remain. This includes the decision whether to grant or deny parole in the first
instance and, if necessary, the decision to revoke parole once granted. It is evident
that the benefits outweigh any concerns or risks.145
D. Wyoming Parole Revocation Data and Discussion.
To better understand this issue, it is necessary to examine the reported dollar
amounts associated with incarcerating an inmate in Wyoming. An examination
of the number of days and dollars involved with crediting street time reveals the
potential for impactful reform to the current system.146 To gauge the effectiveness of
flipping the statutory presumption with regard to street time, the author requested
all parole revocation findings from the Wyoming Board beginning in 2016 and
ending with the fiscal year 2021.147 The results were quite revealing. Put simply,
the amendment has had no effect upon the amount of street time granted to
parolees.148 For example, in 2016, the Board considered 39,819 days of street
time and granted 13,504 days, for a grant rate of thirty-four percent.149 In 2017,
the Board considered 63,315 days of street time and granted 21,739 days, for a
second consecutive year with a grant rate of thirty-four percent.150 In 2018, the
Board considered 76,388 days of street time and granted 17,298 days, for a grant
rate of twenty-three percent.151
After Wyoming’s statutory amendment in 2019, the Board considered 22,251
days of street time and granted 6,404 days, for a grant rate of twenty-nine percent.152
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In 2020, the Board considered 46,854 days of street time and granted 15,769 days,
for a grant rate of thirty-four percent.153 Lastly, for the first half of 2021, the Board
considered 20,397 days of street time and granted 6,399 days, for a grant rate
of thirty-one percent. These results are nearly unchanged when compared with
the percentages reported before the amendment.154 These findings are consistent
with what the CSG concluded in 2019—Wyoming’s parole revocation statute
predisposes the Board to impose lengthy periods of incarceration following
parole violations.155
Not only did the statutory change fail to make an impact on street time, the
number of parolees who are revoked for new felony convictions remains quite low.156
In 2016, only five percent of parole revocations involved new felony convictions.157
From 2017 to 2021, the percentages of new felony convictions among those who
had their parole revoked numbered fifteen percent for 2017, seventeen percent for
2018, nine percent for 2019, ten percent for 2020, and ten percent for 2021.158
The expense involved with incarcerating inmates in Wyoming also ranks
among the highest in the Nation. In 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union
reported that it cost between $35,000 and $53,000 per year to house one prisoner
in Wyoming.159 This estimate was in line with the national average annual cost per
inmate of $33,274 as reported by the Vera Institute in 2015.160 A recent estimate
of the cost to house a Wyoming inmate stated it totaled about $131 per day.161
According to the Sentencing Project, the price per inmate housed in prison only
(not jail) is $161 per day.162 While estimates of the cost to house an inmate may
vary, it is abundantly clear that Wyoming could save a substantial amount of money
and resources by mandating the award of street time upon parole revocation as
suggested below.163
153

Id.

154

Id.

155

See Adu-Num et al., supra note 9, at 86.

156

See Fetsco, supra note 147.

157

Id.

158

Id.

Jennifer Horvath & Ryan Frost, ACLU, Incarceration in Wyoming: 2013
Report on Prison & Jail Complaints 3 (2014), https://www.aclu-wy.org/sites/default/files/field_
documents/2013_incarceration_wyoming_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMP2-9FXX].
159

160
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IV. Recommendations
Not only is Wyoming facing an unprecedented budget crisis, but the State
continues to engage in wasteful correctional practices that appear to have minimal
benefits to public safety.164 Given that the recent statutory changes have failed to
produce a higher grant rate of street time, the State continues to burn hundreds of
thousands of dollars while needlessly incarcerating low-risk parolees who undergo
revocation.165 The following recommendations are realistic and feasible ways of
halting this practice, freeing up much needed resources, and combatting the
forecasted budget crisis that is facing the state.166
A. Recommendation One: Grant Parolees Street Time
The most important recommendation is to modify Wyoming’s current parole
statute to require that the Board credit parolees with all of their street time, provided
they are not convicted of a new felony offense or abscond from parole supervision.167
For instance, in Kentucky, if parole is revoked, the period of time on parole will
count as part of the offender’s sentence unless the offender returned to prison on a
new felony conviction, or if new felony charges have been filed.168 Kentucky also
denies crediting street time if the parolee absconds from supervision, if the parolee
owes restitution, or if the parolee is classified as a violent offender or sex offender.169
A key finding from the 2018 Wyoming CSG report determined that eightyseven percent of parolees who return to prison violated their parole with no new
felony conviction.170 While these particular parolees may indeed deserve a return
to prison, they should retain their street time for several reasons. The first rationale,
discussed below, is based on the CSG report, demonstrating that denying credit
for time served is fiscally irresponsible.171 The CSG report recommended that
Wyoming reduce probation and parole revocation length of stay by just over fifty
percent to slow prison growth.172 Presumably, at least concerning parole revocations,
this proposal would achieve that result with little to no expense to Wyoming
taxpayers.173 The second rationale is rooted in fairness, demonstrating that denying
credit for time served is an inequitable outcome.
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1. Fiscal Responsibility Rationale
The 2018 CSG report findings bluntly concluded that Wyoming taxpayers
face a fifty-million-dollar bill to accommodate projected prison growth by 2023.174
One obvious and easy solution lies in Wyoming’s parole statutes. The CSG found
Wyoming’s statutes unnecessarily predispose the Board toward imposing lengthy
periods of incarceration following parole violations.175 The CSG report also
recommended that Wyoming reduce the high cost of revocations “by expanding
the sanctions continuum with shorter, cost-effective incarceration periods.”176 The
proposal recommended is not a sanction but would serve to produce shorter periods
of incarceration for many of the parolees who undergo revocation in Wyoming.177
The 2019 modification to Wyoming’s parole revocation statute has proven
to be largely cosmetic.178 Therefore, a more significant change is needed. Simply
flipping the presumption to favor crediting street time upon revocation appears
to not have improved the grant rate.179 Consequently, Wyoming should further
amend its parole revocation statute to mandate parolees be credited all of their street
time.180 Enacting this proposed change would benefit Wyoming taxpayers, and
involve little expense or risk to public safety.181 Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon
commented in 2020 that the recent budget cuts to the Wyoming Department of
Corrections will make Wyoming communities less safe and lead to people spending
more time behind bars.182 In that same article, Andrew Graham, a journalist who
spent years covering criminal justice reform in Wyoming, observed that Wyoming’s
lawmakers “have yet to offer any spending reductions of their own.”183 Virtually
everyone in prison will be released someday, especially those who have undergone
parole revocation for technical violations or misdemeanors. Keeping this particular
class of offenders in prison for extended periods of time is a waste of resources.184
Wyoming is running out of money, and the economic future does not look
promising.185 Nonetheless, Wyoming spends $131 per day per inmate, and many
of the state’s inmates are former parolees returned to prison for technical violations
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or misdemeanors.186 Amending Wyoming’s parole revocation statute could alleviate
some of the economic hurdles Wyoming currently faces.187
2. Fairness and Equity Rationale
Crediting parolees with street time, particularly when the violations are
technical or misdemeanor convictions, would be both equitable and fiscally
responsible. While it may seem fitting punishment to return parolees to prison
for violating parole, to deny street time credit for time spent on parole without
absconding or committing a serious crime ignores the hardships that one endures
every day while on parole.188
As the Court made abundantly clear in Samson v. California, life on parole is
the closest legal status that one can live under compared to the liberty restraints
imposed by prison, short of actually being confined behind bars.189 James Binnall,
an ex-parolee, practicing attorney, and professor of Criminal Justice at California
State Long Beach, observed that life on parole not only strips the individual of their
Fourth Amendment protections, but hampers the reentry process:
Police will search without suspicion and without objectively verifiable
knowledge that one is one parole. This final piercing strike to a parolee’s
Fourth Amendment protections frustrates what many proponents
of the parole system view as the principal objective of supervised
release: reintegration. Courts no longer consider parole a reduction
of liberty or a diminution of protection; now the legal system treats
us and those with whom we come into contact, as if we were still
in prison.190
If the goal of early release from prison is to promote reintegration into society,
it makes little sense to equate parole with prison. Further, to deny an offender credit
for time spent on parole, while deeming it akin to incarceration, is fundamentally
unfair and exposes an area of the law that can be aptly described as hypocritical.191
Thus, for moral, pragmatic economic, and legal reasons, Wyoming should credit
parolees with their street time if they are revoked.
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B. Recommendation Two: Implement Standards
There are currently no standards or requirements to be a Wyoming Board
member.192 This recommendation proposes implementing eligibility standards
into the Board’s statutes governing member appointment. Experts in the field
have highlighted the significance of including such formal eligibility standards
as fundamental to ensuring “greater competency and balance in parole board
memberships.”193 Wyoming should modify the institutional structure of its Board
to ensure members have the requisite education and expertise necessary to make
effective release decisions.194 The state should maintain gubernatorial approval,
but the candidates should be recommended for appointment by a special
nonpartisan panel.195
Specifically, the eligibility standards should require a college degree in
criminology, corrections, or a related social science or a law degree.196 Additionally,
Board members should have at least five years of work experience in corrections, the
criminal justice or community corrections field, or criminal law.197 While each facet
of the member eligibility proposal may not be practical for Wyoming, adopting
any formal eligibility standards for appointment to the Board would be a step in
the right direction help guarantee consistent and informed decisions.198

V. Conclusion
The arbitrary and inconsistent treatment of parole street time in Wyoming
must end. By amending the statutes as recommended, our Legislators would uphold
Wyoming’s Constitutional directive that “[t]he penal code shall be framed on the
humane principles of reformation and prevention.”199 When discretionary parole
and indeterminate sentencing began to fade, so did most of the scholarly attention
to the subject of parole. That is unfortunate given the large number of individuals
on parole that contribute to mass incarceration levels in the United States.200
Wyoming has been wise to maintain indeterminate sentencing and discretionary
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parole, resisting the ill-conceived movement to abolish parole.201 The current
treatment of parole street time, however, is an economic drain on the State and
needs reformation, as mandated by the state constitution.202
Although little attention has been given to prison release as an area of reform,
parole boards play a vital role in the criminal justice system. Wyoming’s parole
statutes are anachronistic and in need of change.203 The first recommendation
would bring relief to Wyoming’s burgeoning prison population and reduce the
State’s incarceration costs.204 The second recommendation would ensure that
Board members are appointed with the requisite skill and experience to make
consistent and informed decisions.205 Additionally, any amendment to Wyoming’s
parole practices would be enhanced by creating comprehensive criteria for Board
membership to strike a balance between relevant backgrounds of appointees.206 To
guide the Board into the future and provide refinement and improved decisionmaking, the State should adopt both of these recommendations.
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